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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION AGAINST PSYCHIATRIC 
POLITICAL ABUSES 
George J. Alexander* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While some instances of alleged psychiatric abuse have 
been litigated, much more remains untested in international 
tribunals. It is even fair to say that issues of human rights 
violations through psychiatric interventions only elicited 
sparse domestic jurisprudence until quite recently.l That is 
not to say that there are not announced principles which ap­
pear to protect against abuse. Such rules exist both nation­
ally and internationally. They are, however, undermined by 
exceptions designed to permit medical treatment for those 
deemed to require it. Unfortunately, those who invoke the 
mental health system, however cynically, usually begin by 
claiming therapeutic aims. Secondly, madness, however de­
scribed, can be used as a claim for relief from legal responsi­
bility, as in the insanity defense, or in claims of legal incom­
petence. This facet of mental health law is customarily 
invoked by persons claiming that it dulls the impact of the 
law on some of the weak. Ironically, it is equally useful to 
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale; Professor of Law 
and former Dean, Director of the Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. The author thanks his former Re­
search Assistant, Susan Mayer, for her help in the preparation of the lectures 
at the Human Rights Institute in Strasbourg on which this article is based. 
Several Research Assistants, notably Evi Barth and Leonid Zilberman, have 
helped to update them and to convert them to this article. 
1. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993); Zinormon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 
113 (1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Allen v. lllinois, 478 
U.S. 364 (1986); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Jones v. United States, 
463 U.S. 354 (1983); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. Smith, 
451 U.S. 454 (1981); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1981); Parnham v. J.R., 442 
U.S. 584 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor v. Donald­
son, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Dusky v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
387 
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others who punish or disadvantage people by labeling them 
mentally ill. 
The dearth of effective opposition to abusive psychiatry is 
not, in my view, the product of its lack of impropriety. 
Rather, it mirrors the fact that psychiatric treatment appears 
to be viewed as part of an admirable scheme to assist patients 
in need of help. At a minimum, it is caught up in the society's 
general admiration for things scientific. Consequently, those 
most active in promoting civil rights in other contexts can 
often be reduced to ambivalence between what they perceive 
as the virtues of human freedom and humanitarian welfare.2 
Mental health law remains unique in leaving advocates in 
doubt as to whether to adopt an adversary position on behalf 
of those they represent or, instead, to join with those seeking 
to force what is described as help on unwilling patients. 
While advocates are in doubt, what can one expect of tribu­
nals and standards writers? This article will discuss the 
United Nations' Principles governing this area and cases 
brought in international tribunals as contrasted to well es­
tablished principles from analogous invasions of personal 
freedoms in quest of a determination of their legality under 
international human rights law. 
II. THE POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY OF PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE 
There are instances of psychiatric intervention which, it 
may be assumed, almost everyone would repudiate. They 
provide a useful platform because there are aspects of com­
monality which emerge best when there is no dispute con­
cerning benefit to the "patient." In 1931, psychiatrists meet­
ing in Bavaria, Germany decried the traditional expressed 
compassion of the nineteenth century and proposed a more 
severe response to chronic mental illness. They proposed 
sterilization and euthanasia.3 By 1936 the eradication of the 
unfit was well enough accepted to merit incidental mention in 
an official German Medical Journal.4 When Hitler institu­
tionalized the idea, he required all state institutions to report 
2. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, et al., The Trauma of a Due Process Hearing 
in the Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 69 (1971). 
3. Alexander, Medical Science under Dictatorship, 2 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
241 (1949). 
4. See id. 
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patients who had been il for five or more years and who were 
unable to work. They were required to fill out questionnaires 
giving the name, race, marital status, nationality, next of kin, 
whether regularly visited and by whom, who bore the finan­
cial responsibility and so forth. The decision regarding which 
patients should be killed was made entirely by expert consul­
tants, most of whom were professors of psychiatry in key uni­
versities. These consultants never saw the patients them­
selves. The thoroughness of their scrutiny can be appraised 
by the work of one expert, who between November 14 and 
December 1, 1940, evaluated 2109 questionnaires.5 
These questionnaires were collected by a "Realm's Work 
Committee of Institutions for Cure and Care."6 A parallel or­
ganization devoted exclusively to the killing of children was 
known by the similarly euphemistic name "Realm's Commit­
tee for Scientific Approach to Severe Illness Due to Heredity 
and Constitution." The "Charitable Transport Company for 
the Sick" transported patients to the killing centers and the 
"Charitable Foundation for Institutional Care" was in charge 
of collecting the costs of the killings from the relatives with­
out, however, informing them of how the charges were to be 
used; in the death certificates, the cause of death was 
falsified. 7 
Fortunately, psychiatric genocide seems to have been de­
feated with its military proponents. It is raised here princi­
pally to demonstrate the utility of medical coloration to 
achieve political ends. In the beginning, it was useful to the 
Nazis to describe incarceration as cure and care and killing 
as charity. Only later was broader genocide possible more 
openly. That utility has not escaped some governments 
which also use coercive psychiatry to achieve political ends. 
The World Psychiatric Association has recognized the 
possibility of psychiatric political abuse. At its 1977 Congress 
in Honolulu, it created a standing committee entitled Com-
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. In describing the group murdered by this process, the authorities 
claimed that only the most severely regressed mental patients were slaugh­
tered. Id. The authorities developed a ruse to get victims into the gas cham­
bers. Id. They were given bars of soap and told to stand under "showers" which 
then released poisoned gas. Id. Despite the claimed disorientation of the 
mental patient group, they marched into the showers, deposited their towels 
and took their soap for their supposed showers. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 37 Santa Clara L. Rev.  390 1996-1997
390 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
mittee to Investigate Abuses of Psychiatry. In 1983 the So­
viet Union withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association 
because of its complaint that it was being discredited by 
Western influences.s While it has never openly confessed to 
the practices which are described herein, it is interesting to 
note that several changes in law have recently been reported 
which seem to validate the concerns. In early 1988, the Pre­
sidium of the Supreme Soviet adopted a rule which permits 
relatives of persons improperly committed to mental institu­
tions to appeal the "medical" decisions made in their cases in 
court. 9 It also makes it criminal to commit a mentally 
healthy person. 10 It was also reported in early 1988 that con­
trol of special psychiatric hospitals was shifted from the po­
lice to the Health Ministry. 11 
Prior to glasnost it was difficult to verify reports concern­
ing the Soviet Union. Block and Reddaway12 have written a 
horrifying account of prior Russian practice which is sup­
ported by other evidence.13 They describe the imprisonment 
8. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XX, No. 13, at 1-3. 
9. What's News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1988, at AI. 
10. Id. 
11. What's News, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1988, at AI. 
12. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, SOVIET PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE: THE SHADOW 
OVER WORLD PSYCHIATRY (1984). 
13. See, e.g. , Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the U.S.S.R. , Amnesty Interna­
tional AI Index, EUR 46/01183 (1983) (an Amnesty International Briefing). The 
anecdotes are numerous. One concerns an Amnesty International prisoner of 
conscience, Nizametdin Akhmetov. He was imprisoned in 1960 for anti-Soviet 
propaganda and agitation. He later was convicted for writing on his cell wall to 
protest conditions in the labor camp to which he was sentenced. In 1982, while 
he was still serving the sentences for his prior convictions, he was convicted of 
circulating "anti-Soviet slander" in a letter he wrote and sent to a psychiatric 
institution for an indefinite period. While in the psychiatric institution he 
wrote to a friend: 
I am in a very bad way my friend. I fear that you may read my letter 
like a letter from a madhouse (from where else you will shrug). . . . I 
am in a very bad way my friend. Never have I suffered so much, never 
was my situation so hopeless. I have dropped out of society, from the 
scope of its laws, I am absolutely without rights, depersonalized, in­
deed dehumanized . . . . There is only one way to escape all this tor­
ment (except the torments of conscience), only one way of crawling out 
of here - that is to betray myself and get out, but no .longer as 
Nizametdin Akhmetov. This way is prohibited for me, but that means 
that they will grind Nizametdin Akhmetov to nothingness on the mill­
stone of 'state security.' 
Of course, I am not ill. Yet I am in an institution which has all the 
means of making me ill. This is no exaggeration: Psychiatry has now 
reached the limits reached by physics when it split the uranium nu-
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of dissidents in mental institutions as confinement of choice. 
It is said to provide three major advantages. First, it avoids 
the procedural safeguards associated with criminal prosecu­
tion .. Second, and more importantly, while a political pris­
oner may aid his cause by being a martyr; a mental patient 
and his cause are discredited by his perceived lunacy. Fi­
nally, there is no finite period for such confinement as op­
posed to criminal sentences which have a definite maximum 
term. 14 
The conditions described in many Soviet institutions 
were savage. In the Soviet Union, for example, psychother­
apy was not available but patients were treated with insulin 
shock and electroconvulsive therapy as well as tranquilizers. 
Punishment was administered by the injection of painful sul­
fur compounds.15 Romania is said to have used similar prac­
tices.16 It apparently. mixed psychiatric confinement with 
physical torture and drugging. For example, it is said to have 
used injections of boiled milk and iodine which, in addition to 
intense pain also caused acute anxiety.17 
The claim that the use of psychiatry to imprison people 
for political reasons is a cardinal violation of international 
human rights will surprise no one.18 That subject will not be 
addressed in detail here because the cynical use of psychiat-
. cleus. It is not just the one man with the white coat over his MVD 
uniform whom I have to face - he has the entire State behind him. 
There is no doubt I am being ground to pieces. It is horrible - the un­
bearable continuous torment, this so called 'treatment' . . . . 
Unfortunately, I shall not see the day when my Motherland her­
self judges me . . . . 
The worst thing that can happen to a person may happen to me. 
In any case, whether I die or whether they drive me mad - that will be 
the end. The end of a human being. Even if it does not happen in a 
human way, as with human beings, it will happen to a human being ­
that's what I wanted to stress. And I would like to be spoken of, and to 
be remembered, as a human being. 
Appeal from a Prisoner of Conscience in a Soviet Psychiatric Hospital, Amnesty 
International AI Index, EUR 46/50/86 (1986) at 2-4 [hereinafter Prisoner of 
Conscience]. 
14. Prisoner of Conscience, supra note 13 at 2-4. 
15. Id. 
16. Romania: Psychiatric Repression of Dissent, Amnesty International AI 
Index, EUR 39/07/78 (1978). 
17. Id. 
18. International Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A[III], U.N. 
GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. Al810 (1948) [hereinafter Declaration of Human 
Rights]. 
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ric institutions to imprison dissidents has so much in com­
mon with other forms of improper imprisonment. Torturing 
psychiatric patients with painful chemical or electrical "treat­
ments" also overlaps other forms of torture19 and so its dis­
cussion can be truncated as well. 
However, it is important to recognize that the unique 
role of psychiatry in discrediting opinion and dehumanizing 
those with whom one disagrees is not limited to totalitarian 
regimes. Indeed, it may be more dangerous in countries in 
which individual rights are generally protected. If people can 
transform their opponents from heroes or even martyrs to 
lunatics in the public's view, they have accomplished a great 
deal. In that sense, psychiatric incarceration may occasion a 
greater intrusion of the rights of the politically unpopular 
than mere jailing. The disagreement among physicians as to 
diagnosis, prognosis and even common terminology20 as well 
19. Id. at art. 5. 
20. In one of the few systematic studies of diagnostic reliability, Ash com­
pared diagnoses made by three psychiatrists on the same patients at a govern­
ment clinic. The patients were examined by psychiatrists jointly, but the diag­
noses were recorded independently. The three agreed on the specific diagnostic 
category in only 20% of the cases. When only a general diagnostic category was 
considered, agreement was higher. Al three psychiatrists agreed in 46% of the 
cases; two psychiatrists agreed in another 51% of the cases; in only 3% of the 
cases did all three disagree. Ash made another rather sobering finding: In fully 
one-third of the cases, one psychiatrist found serious pathology, while the other 
two found the patient to be, with some qualifications, a normal individual. 
Moreover, the joint examinations may have inflated the levels of agreement by 
allowing tacit communication among psychiatrists. 
The findings of later researchers have generally been consistent with Ash's 
findings. In general, researchers have found that the level of reliability, as 
measured by inter-psychiatrist agreement on specific diagnostic categories, is 
quite low, typically in the neighborhood of 32%. 
See Ralph Reisner & Herbert Semmel, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look 
at the Proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Ex­
perience, 62 CAL. L. REV. 773, 776 (1974). 
Traditionally, psychiatrists have developed descriptive diagnostic labels 
which they use in categorizing and dealing with patients. Although most psy­
chiatrists use these designations, they do not agree on their nature, significance 
or utility. Some psychiatrists maintain that the labels denote different disease 
conditions; others maintain that they apply to reaction patterns having mani­
fest similarities and in no way describe disease conditions. The opinions of 
most psychiatrists probably fall somewhere between the two; they accept some 
of the diagnostic categories as disease categories, and they view others as con­
venient ways of grouping reaction patterns. DAVID MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH 
AND SOCIAL POLICY 13 (1969). 
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as pressures to over-predict mental illness21 makes assertion 
of mental illness relatively easy, especially for those who also 
control the mental institutions. In addition, since psychiatric 
intervention is described as medical treatment, it is not in the 
class of activities for which strict procedural impediments are 
routinely established. Were criminal punishment proposed 
instead, one would expect barriers to guard against the inad­
vertent identification of the innocent. Treatment suggests be­
nevolent conduct and the absence of need to guard against its 
imposition. When procedures exist, they tend to be consider­
ably more lax than their criminal counterpart. This is true in 
domestic cases and all the more true when the issue is raised 
in an international complaint. 
The conjunction of the effect of stigmatization, disagree­
ment as to what, if anything, constitutes mental illness and 
the laxness of procedural protections make the use of psychi­
atry effective as a tool of political oppression. In the West, 
some problems relating to the use of psychiatry by those who 
intentionally pervert the process for their national political 
purposes exist. An infinitely larger group is affected by psy­
chiatric manipulation in the interest of individual 
aggrandizement. 
Several United States cases will be used to illustrate the 
point for the following reasons: First, the cases arise in the 
legal system with which the author is personally most famil­
iar; secondly, the United States is generally recognized as a 
country with a passion for the protection of individual auton­
omy (it is also correctly seen as a country in which private 
litigation in aid of law is very highly developed); third, there 
appears little indication that the country has a national pol­
icy respecting the perversion of psychiatric institutions for 
political ends. Mental institutions are creatures of state and 
local governments and they, as well, seem not to have an or­
ganized arrangement for the use of hospitals to silence dis­
sent. The use of domestic cases is not intended to assert that 
problems in the United States are worse than in other coun­
tries. Instead, America serves simply as an example of the 
problems that exist everywhere. 
21. Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 
U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1974). 
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One of the most famous cases was that of Ezra Pound.22 
Ezra Pound was indicted for treason against the United 
States for his activities in Rome during the Second World 
War. He made radio broadcasts in which he denounced the 
British and the Jews and expressed hope for an Axis vic­
tory.23 After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, Pound 
and his wife attempted to return to the United States but 
permission to enter was denied. Since he could not re-enter 
the United States, he stayed in Rome and continued his trea­
sonous radio broadcasts for the Italian government. When 
the Allies invaded Italy, Pound was arrested for treason and 
returned to Washington. 24 
Pound never admitted that the broadcasts were treason­
ous; he claimed that they were patriotic because they called 
for an end to the war. Rather than actually try Pound for 
treason, the United States government and Pound's defense 
attorney decided that it would be better to declare Pound un­
fit to stand trial and commit him to a mental institution. 
Consequently, psychiatric evidence was introduced by the 
Government to show his unfitness for trial. The Govern­
ment's witnesses found that Pound suffered from paranoia. 
However, 
[n]o evidence was introduced to prove that, in spite of his 
peculiarities, Pound could not be treated as a responsible 
defendant. Instead, unproved allegations were insinu­
ated, such as his being 'less and less able to order his life.' 
This psychiatric accusation was simply untrue. Before 
the American troops landed in Italy, Pound was able to 
order his life well enough to stay out of the hands of psy­
chiatrists. Whereas, since the end of the European War 
he had been a prisoner, his life having been 'ordered' for 
him.25 
After the introduction of the psychiatric testimony, the 
trial judge instructed the jury in a manner that allowed them 
to find Pound unfit to stand trial in only three minutes.26 He 
was committed to St. Elizabeth Hospital where he remained 
for thirteen years, from 1945 to 1958. In 1958, a motion was 
22. JONAS B. ROBITSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 105-06 (1980). 
23. [d. at 106. 
24. [d. 
25. THoMAS S. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 202 (1963) [hereinafter 
SZASZ, LAw AND LIBERTY]. 
26. [d. at 202-03. 
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filed in the District of Colombia Circuit asking that the in­
dictment for treason be dismissed. The original psychiatrist 
testified saying that although Pound was incurably insane, 
he was not dangerous and it would be safe to release him into 
his wife's care. The petition was also supported by many of 
Pound's friends who were famous poets and writers including 
Robert Frost, Ernest Hemingway, and T.S. Eliot. On April 
18, 1958, with the consent of the government, the indictment 
against Pound was dismissed by Judge Laws.27 Pound, in ef­
fect, had the last word. 28 
Although the efforts were more informal, the Nixon ad­
ministration also made use of psychiatric labeling to discredit 
its enemies. After Daniel Ellsberg released the Pentagon Pa­
pers, the White House authorized a break-in at the office of 
his psychiatrist in an unsuccessful effort to find incriminating 
psychiatric evidence to use against him.29 During the same 
period, Martha Mitchell, the wife of the soon to be convicted 
Attorney General, was kept from revealing information about 
the Watergate break-in by a combination of physical restraint 
and informing the press that she was mentally unbalanced. 30 
There was also the case of General Walker.31 During the 
federal attempt to integrate the University of Mississippi by 
physically supporting the enrollment of James Meredith, an 
African American student, former Major General Edwin A. 
Walker was arrested, charged with crimes, and then held for 
psychiatric examination.32 As Dr. Szasz has noted, 
"[ w ]ithout a doubt, this is the most widely publicized case 
ever reported in the American press of an attempt to deny an 
accused person the right to trial by branding him insane and 
hence incompetent to stand trial."33 
To support the government's claim that Walker was too 
sick to stand trial, the government furnished an affidavit 
27. Id. at 203. Judge Laws was the judge who had originally presided at 
the competency hearing. 
28. "It has been your habit for long to do away with good writers, You either 
drive them mad, or else you blink at their suicides, Or else you condone their 
drugs, and talk of insanity and genius, But I will not go mad to please you." 
[sic] Id. at 199 (quoting Pound). 
29. ROBITSCHER, supra note 22, at 340. 
30. Id. at 341-43. 
31. The facts about this case are taken from THOMAS SZASZ, SZASZ, PSYCHI. 
ATRIC JUSTICE 178 (1965) [hereinafter SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE]. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
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from a psychiatrist who had never met Walker but who had 
been given government collected descriptions of Walker's be­
havior.34 The doctor's affidavit concluded: "Some of his [Gen. 
Walker's] reported behavior reflects sensitivity and essen­
tially unpredictable and seemingly bizarre outbursts of the 
type often observed in individuals suffering with paranoid 
mental disorder. There are also indications in his medical 
history of functional and psychosomatic disorders which 
could be precursors of the more serious disorder which his 
present behavior suggests."35 Another psychiatrist then re­
viewed the first affidavit and the government's evidence and 
concurred without seeing Walker. Walker was committed.36 
Walker's attorney characterized the commitment order 
as "simply fantastic" in light of the fact that he had just 
talked to him over a two-day period and found him "in com­
plete possession of all mental faculties. "37 Three days after 
Walker's arrest, his attorney filed a writ of habeas corpus. 
The district judge issued an order to show cause to the gov­
ernment. Rather than produce evidence of the reasonable­
ness of Walker's confinement, the government released him 
on $50,000 bond. However, he was ordered to undergo a psy­
chiatric evaluation. In the subsequent examination, Walker 
was found competent to stand trial. At the hearing the gov­
ernment produced still another psychiatrist who had never 
seen Walker to testify to his incompetence.38 
During this period, the media had already started report­
ing that Walker was crazy. Walker sued for libel and won a 
judgment against the media defendants. After he was found 
competent to stand trial, it had yet to be determined whether 
there was sufficient evidence to indict him on riot charges. 
On January 21, 1963, the Grand Jury failed to indict him. 39 
The government's plan to convert the matter from the 
apparently weak criminal case to a psychiatric one failed but 
the illustration is a useful demonstration of how even demo­
cratic governments can use psychiatry to achieve their ends. 
34. [d. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. at 181. 
37. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 182. 
38. [d. 
39. [d. 
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The major intrusion of psychiatry on human values is yet 
another troubling facet of its uses. As one author has put it: 
For three hundred years, psychiatry has had a role in con­
trolling deviant behavior. Eccentrics, "originals," va­
grants, and homeless wanderers who caused little harm 
but were irritating to the society they lived in were, and 
sometimes still are, hospitalized or deprived of legal 
rights. Some critics of psychiatry see this as a political 
use of psychiatry and see psychiatry as promoting 
conformity.40 
Another author described the danger of psychiatric abuse as 
follows: 
Lacking the integrity of a scientific definition, the concept 
of mental health-and its antonym, mental illness-has 
succumbed to what Bertrand Russell (1953) called the cult 
of common usage. In contemporary America it has come 
to mean conformity to the demands of society. According 
to the common- sense definition, mental health is the abil­
ity to play the game of social living, and to play it well. 
Conversely, mental illness is the refusal to play, or the in­
ability to play well.41 
The cases that demonstrate the broader concern just ex­
pressed are numerous.42 More frightening is the knowledge 
that very few instances of psychiatric abuse lead to reported 
appellate cases. The following cases will illustrate this point, 
both of which depict how the changing role of women gener­
ated a good deal of psychiatric intervention. 
Elizabeth Packard (1816-1890)43 was a strong believer in 
Christianity. She believed that people are born good and 
taught others this philosophy. Her husband, a minister, did 
not care for her philosophy because it was contrary to his. He 
forbade her from expressing her contrary opinions. She re­
fused to obey him. 
"In 1860 Elizabeth Packard's husband psychiatrically 
imprisoned her because she dared to engage in 'free religious 
40. ROBITSCHER, supra note 22, at 326-27. 
41. SZASZ, LAW AND LIBERTY, supra note 25, at 205. 
42. See generally SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 31; THOMAS S. 
SZASZ, INSANITY: THE IDEA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1987); GEORGE J. ALEXAN­
DER, WRITING A LIVING WILL: USING A DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY, Ch. 1 
(1988) [hereinafter LIVING WILL]. 
43. This case study is based on the information found in PHYLLIS CHESLER, 
WOMEN AND MADNESS (1972). 
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inquiry"'.44 He kidnapped her and committed her to an asy­
lum in Jacksonville, Illinois. He refused to allow their chil­
dren to see her and deprived her of her personal belongings. 
Mrs. Packard kept a diary during her time in the asylum, 
which she published following her escape after three years of 
confinement. Subsequent to her release, she fought for the 
legal rights of mental patients.45 
Zelda Fitzgerald (1900-1948) was the wife of renowned 
writer F. Scott Fitzgerald.46 Fitzgerald disapproved of his 
wife's devotion to the arts, and felt that she was too self-ab­
sorbed. Fitzgerald was also apparently threatened by his 
wife's aspiration to write. He was very upset when she pub­
lished her own autobiography before Scott had published a 
story about Zelda's life and psychiatric confinement. He for­
bade her to continue writing because her role was to be wife 
and mother. To this, Zelda rebelled. 
She wants to be a "creative artist": she wants "work." 
Only if she does "good work" can she defend herself 
against Scott's slighting comments. She . . . is tired of 
being forced into accepting Scott's opinions and decisions 
about everything. In fact, she would not do so, she would 
rather be hospitalized. She feels that their marriage has 
been nothing but a struggle from the beginning.47 
Zelda's psychiatrists tried to re-educate her into her role 
as wife and mother.48 She said she would rather be a writer 
than have a life with Scott. Zelda was diagnosed with an in­
feriority complex and released after fifteen months' confine­
ment, only to be re-admitted later. "The psychiatrists de­
clared her ambitions to be forms of self-deceptions, which had 
deeply troubled their marriage. Over the years, despite 
Zelda's pitiful requests for freedom, her obedient confessions 
of self-blame, and her promises of 'good behavior,' the men 
decided if and when she could spend 'vacations' outside the 
asylum. "49 Zelda died in a mental asylum fire before ever 
regaining her freedom. 
44. Id. at 9. 
45. Id. 
46. See id. at 7-9 (providing information from which this case study is 
based). 
47. CHESLER, supra note 43, at 9. 
48. See id. at 8-9. 
49. Id. at 13. 
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Fortunately, the feminist movement has encouraged law 
revision against discriminations based on gender and the re­
visions have, at least on occasion, applied to psychiatric 
abuse. In Lenihan v. City of New York ,50 a federal district 
court reviewed a discrimination claim filed by a female police 
officer. Plaintiff, after being laid off, had participated in a 
class action claim of sexual discrimination against her police 
department. The action regained plaintiff her job and gained 
female police officers substantial seniority and related bene­
fits. In retaliation, plaintiff claimed, she was subjected to a 
psychological evaluation in which she was found "below stan­
dard" principally because of her lack of self confidence. The 
matter escalated and she was later sent to an internal Psy­
chiatric Board which concluded that she was unfit, for psychi­
atric reasons, to serve in the Department. 
A number of discrepancies, too numerous to recount 
here, convinced the judge that the result was the product of 
sex discrimination. He noted that there was a climate of hos­
tility to women in the Department, that no one could recall 
any other police officer ever having been referred for psychi­
atric review solely because of perceived deficiency of self con­
fidence. While unprepared to reject psychiatric diagnoses, he 
concluded that a substantial amount of it was "unhesitat­
ingly" based on the accounts of a police captain whose views 
he [found] to be affected in some significant measure by her 
sex, and that they rendered their opinions to accommodate 
their belief that she was unwelcome on the force.51 Still hesi­
tant to substitute his own views as to her mental condition, 
he at least restrained the Department from discharging her 
on the basis of the record they had compiled. 
If Lenihan marks progress, it should be noted it does so 
sparingly. In the end, doctors, whose motivations the judge 
derided, had the last word. The possibility raised by their 
findings prevented an order fully reinstating her and left it 
open to the Department to make a record with fewer errors 
on the basis of which they could, presumably, still discharge 
her for behaving in a manner they did not approve. 
50. 636 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. N.Y. 1985). 
51. See id. at 1014-15. 
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The debate continues over the legitimacy of characteriz­
ing as illness conduct perceived to be inappropriate.52 In 
1988, a divided United States Supreme Court was confronted 
with the issue in a veterans' benefits case which turned sig­
nificantly on whether alcoholism was willful misconduct as 
opposed to a protected disability. Although the Court did not 
have to decide whether or not alcoholism was a disease, the 
majority opinion could not repress commenting approvingly 
on the Court of Appeals' finding that there is "a substantial 
body of medical literature that even contests . . .  that alcohol­
ism is a disease. "53 
While all decisions which transform conduct into disease 
raise prospects of political abuse, paranoia and its permuta­
tions are among those most likely to achieve suppression of 
dissent, as Ezra Pound's case illustrates. When the act of 
harboring complaints is the "illness" and when its severity 
varies directly with the intensity of the complaints, one can 
see that it is a perfect tool for political abuse. There is no 
reliable data on how many people are involuntarily institu­
tionalized because they stubbornly insist on what they con­
sider the truth. 54 The author has represented several such 
clients. One, Roy Schuster, had been incarcerated for twenty­
five years in a mental institution when the author and an­
other civil rights attorney undertook his case. His diagnosis 
was paranoia. When questioned about the basis of the diag­
nosis, the attending psychiatrist testified that Mr. Schuster 
had told the warden of his prison that there was corruption in 
the prison and had refused to date to recant. 55 Another client 
was held to be paranoid when he wrote his Congressman 
complaining about the military assignment he had 
received. 56 
Not only are people placed involuntarily in mental insti­
tutions, many others are deprived of control over their wealth 
52. The debate was popularly initiated by THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF 
MENTAL ILLNESS (1961). 
53. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 550 (1988). 
54. See Prisoner of Conscience, supra note 13 (sketching a Soviet case that 
fits this description). 
55. Trial Transcript, Herold v. Schuster, 396 U.S. 847 (1969) (No. 248) (on 
file with author). 
56. In re LCDR "C", unreported military ''fitness" hearing (official summary 
in author's files). 
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by guardianship,57 still others are "voluntarily" placed in in­
stitutions by their guardians who have not obtained their 
consent, having accused them of mental imbalance. 58 Many 
who are not institutionalized are dehumanized by being la­
beled mentally ill. 
The generic feature of an accusation of mental illness or 
insanity is that it diverts attention from the accuser to the 
accused. A dissenter's political message is drowned in his or 
her alleged lunacy. The accused politician who charges his 
attacker with being mentally ill, for example, escapes legal 
notice while concern shifts to the ward's mental health. Fail­
ure to conform to common conduct is condemned as illness. 
Some of the abuses result simply from the stigma at­
tached to an accusation of lunacy. For them, defamation law 
is the only legal remedy. The great bulk of abuses, however, 
require the active participation of the state. For that reason, 
they fall within the state's obligation to conform to agreed 
upon human rights standards. When the state cynically uses 
psychiatric institutions to stifle dissent, its violation is obvi­
ous. It is, however, also the state that inters mental patients 
and uses its force to keep them in institutions at the behest of 
security personnel or litigants, and so must be charged with 
the impropriety of the parties if it exists. 59 It is the state 
which divests allegedly incompetent persons of their control 
of property, and so it must guard against enforcing private 
schemes which use mental illness as an excuse for achieving 
private ends. The state ultimately legitimates the definition 
of normality and, so, is responsible when it adopts standards 
which discriminate against the legitimate aspirations of wo­
men or persons with homosexual proclivities or otherwise en­
shrined conformity. 
In short, the state must guard against using or endorsing 
the use of the concept of mental illness as a means of achiev­
ing improper ends. It must do so whether the impropriety is 
57. See generally LIVING WILL, supra note 42, at chs. 1-3. 
58. Von Luce v. Rankin, 588 S.W.2d 445 (Ark. 1979); AMERICAN BAR 
FOUND., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 260 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ron­
ald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971). 
59. Cf, Shelley v Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (developing this point with 
respect to privately made racial covenants which it declared unconstitutional). 
Since only the state is governed by the relevant constitutional principle, it 
found "state action" in the necessary enforcement which courts provided for the 
private contracts and without which they would have no effect. [d. 
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its own or that of a private party, if the state's authority is 
invoked. In that regard, there is no country of which the au­
thor is aware that has met its minimal obligations to interna­
tional human rights. 
III. REVIEW OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES 
To what extent do international guarantees of human 
rights deal with such problems? As a beginning, one might 
look to basic guarantees of human rights from the United Na­
tions Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 60 This docu­
ment sets forth the fundamental rights of all people which 
are to be established and protected by the Member States. 
The list is quite formidable. Pertinent to the problem of the 
abuse of psychiatry and commitment to mental institutions 
are the following Articles: 
1. Article 3 provides that everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of person. 
2. Article 5 provides that "no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. " 
3. Article 8 requires that there be a "right to an effective 
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating 
the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by 
law. " 
4. Article 9 proscribes "arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile." 
5. Article 10 provides that "[e]veryone is entitled in full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and ob­
ligations and of any criminal charge against him. " 
6. Article 12 protects a person's family, reputation and 
honor from interference or attacks. 
7. Article 18 ensures that "[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion . . . .  "
8. Article 19 states that "[e]veryone has the right to free­
dom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regard­
less of frontiers. " 
60. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 18, at 71. 
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All of these rights have been sacrificed for coercive psy­
chiatric intervention in certain cases. 
Since the Universal Declaration, the United Nations in 
1975 adopted a Declaration of Rights of Disabled Persons 
which includes the mentally ill.61 It also adopted without 
vote Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Ill­
ness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care on De­
cember 17,1991. The Principles are far better than other UN 
work on the subject but it remains unclear what their effect 
will be. In brief summary they provide: 
Principle 1 adopts fundamental freedoms and basic 
rights principally: best available medical care, protection 
from exploitation and degradation as well as discrimination; 
retention of political and civil rights and, most importantly, 
legal representation to contest alleged incapacity, a fair hear­
ing and the right to appeal and for periodic review of incapac­
ity if it is found. 
Principle 2 provides for special protection of minors, ex­
pressly recognizing the need to have a representative other 
than a family member if necessary. 
Principle 3 provides a mentally ill person the right to live 
and work in the community to the extent possible. 
Principle 4 provides that mental illness shall not be de­
termined on the basis of status nor shall societal non-con­
formity be used as a factor; prior treatment or hospitalization 
shall not justify present or future determination that a per­
son is mentally ill; present classification of mental illness is 
limited to purposes directly relating to mental illness. Unfor­
tunately, it also uncritically adopts "internationally accepted 
medical standards " suggesting that such standards exist and 
can be found. 
Principle 5 limits the right to force medical examination 
to determine mental health. 
Principle 6 requires confidentiality concerning those to 
whom the principles apply. 
Principle 7 states a preference for community based 
treatment. 
Principle 8 requires the same standard of social and med­
ical care as is appropriate to other illnesses. 
61. Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447, U.N. 
GAOR, 30th Sess. (adopted Dec. 9,1975). 
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Principle 9 requires that all treatment aim at preserving 
personal autonomy, be individuated and least restrictive. 
Principle 10 limits medication to that which is medici­
nally required. 
Principle 1 1  provides elaborate informed consent 
requirements. 
Principle 12 provides for notice of rights. 
Principle 13 provides for specific rights in mental health 
facilities. 
Principle 14 mandates a level of resources for mental 
health facilities modeled on general health facilities. 
Principle 15 provides that admissions procedures make 
every effort to avoid involuntary admission and that volun­
tary patients be allowed to leave at will. 
Principle 16 provides the conditions for involuntary ad­
mission and limits them to danger to self and others and 
grave disability and requires that periods of such confine­
ment be short. 
Principle 17 provides for a review body and its 
procedures. 
Principle 18 provides for procedural due process 
safeguards. 
Principle 19 gives patients access to his or her records. 
Principle 20 allows confinement of criminal offenders 
who are mentally il but requires the same level of treatment 
as for others. 
Principle 21 provides for a right to complain. 
Principle 22 requires a state to monitor compliance. 
Principle 23 says states should implement the Principles 
and make them widely known. 
Principle 24 applies the Principles to all who are admit­
ted to mental institutions. 
Principle 25 saves other rights not mentioned in the 
Principles. 
It is important to note that this document recognizes 
mental health treatment and confinement as potentially 
quite harmful and attempts to limit it unlike the case law 
which generally treats both as presumptively beneficial and 
socially acceptable. 
Also instructive is the important European Convention 
on Human Rights which prohibits torture and inhuman or 
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degrading treatment or punishment.62 It also ensures liberty 
and security of person. In addition Article 10 provides a right 
to free expression; Article 9 prescribes the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; and Article 8 ensures the 
right to respect for an individual's privacy and that of his 
family. There have been many cases brought before the Eu­
ropean Commission on Human Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights for the enforcement of the rights 
guaranteed in the Convention. Whatever may be true of 
their impact on persons not accused of mental illness, they do 
not offer much hope to involuntary mental patients. 
Begin by considering a case of confinement in a mental 
institution as an alternative to prison-in itself quite com­
mon. In Y. v. United Kingdom, Y had been convicted by a 
criminal court of numerous counts of fraud.63 Under the ap­
plicable domestic law, a court may order a defendant to be 
confined to a mental institution in lieu of prison if the circum­
stances warrant it. Y was examined by four psychiatrists 
(two chosen by his solicitors) who agreed that Y was suffering 
from paranoid schizophrenia. They disagreed, however, as to 
the treatment required. The psychiatrists appointed by V's 
solicitors found that he should be confined to either a mini­
mum security hospital or treated on an out-patient basis. 
The Crown's psychiatrists found that he should be confined at 
Broadmoor, a maximum security institution housing the in­
sane. The domestic court ordered his incarceration in 
Broadmoor.64 
Before the Commission, Y attempted to obtain an order 
transferring him to a lower security mental institution. He 
alleged that Broadmoor was overcrowded, lacked privacy, 
and had inadequate sanitary facilities. He further claimed 
that he was not given treatment or even an explanation of 
what treatment was necessary, and lacked fresh air and exer­
cise. He also indicated that there were inadequate fire pre­
cautions and that he lived in constant fear, all in violation of 
Article 3 of the Convention. He further complained of his 
compulsory, indefinite detention in a mental hospital without 
62. Collection of Decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights, 
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 1-20 (1981). 
63. Y. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6870175, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 37, 37 ( 1979). 
64. [d. at 38. 
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periodic judicial review of the substantive justification for the 
detention, citing Article 5 of the Convention.65 
In evaluating his first claim; that the conditions at 
Broadmoor were inhumane or degrading in violation of Arti­
cle 3's protection of life, liberty and personal security, the 
Commission concluded: 
The ill treatment must attain a certain level of severity if 
it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment 
of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it de­
pends on all the circumstances of the cases such as the 
duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects 
and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the 
victim. 66 
The conditions at Broadmoor were thought to result pri­
marily from overcrowding. The Commission acknowledged 
that the Broadmoor facility was grossly overcrowded, but con­
cluded that the applicant had a "tendency to exaggerate the 
inadequacy of conditions in Broadmoor Hospital partly be­
cause of his uncooperative and negative attitude towards the 
institution where he considered he should never have been 
detained."67 The Commission concluded on a vote of 8-5 that 
there was no violation of Article 3.68 
Note how comfortably the Commission indicated that his 
claims could be disregarded because he was crazy. For a per­
son not crazy, being negative about being institutionalized 
would, presumably, be normal. The Commission also found 
that there was a lack of sanitary facilities in all the dormito­
ries, but again stated that "[iJt appears that the applicant un­
duly and obsessively magnified his complaint concerning the 
absence of toilet paper."69 Since he was crazy, he apparently 
improperly missed toilet paper. As to his feeling that he 
should never have been detained at Broadmoor, two of the 
four psychiatrists agreed. Indeed, the question of whether his 
mental state required involuntary confinement in such a 
place was at issue but the Commission apparently thought 
65. [d. at 39. 
66. Y. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6870175, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 37 (1979). 
67. [d. 
68. Dissenting opinions were filed by three members of the Commission. 
[d. 
69. [d. 
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that issue foreclosed because his complaints were a product of 
his mental state. 
As to the violations of Article 5 which ensures freedom 
from inhuman and degrading treatment, the Commission 
found that since the applicant was committed to Broadmoor 
by order of a competent court, no violation had occurred. 70 
They also concluded that the conditions at Broadmoor were 
not as inhumane or degrading as Y indicated, based on their 
determination that Y had a habit of exaggerating. The Com­
mission did not even address Y's complaints that he did not 
receive proper medical treatment and was not apprised of 
which treatment was necessary, finding that there were good 
grounds for concluding that the applicant was mentally il. 
They were persuaded of the merit of this diagnosis because 
four psychiatrists concurred that Y suffered from paranoid 
schizophrenia and two were appointed by the applicant's so­
licitors. Thus, they found it was not unreasonable for him to 
be incarcerated in Broadmoor. 
Perhaps the Commission missed the point. The value of 
the diagnostic concurrence by the four psychiatrists is over­
shadowed by the fact that they had fundamentally different 
opinions about Y's mental state, as demonstrated by their 
disagreement concerning treatment.71 On that they were 
evenly divided. 
As to the charge that he did not receive psychiatric or 
medical treatment, the Commission found that Y refused psy­
chiatric treatment because he thought himself sane. Y stated 
that he refused treatment because the need for it was not ex­
plained to him. The facts also reveal a dispute between the 
applicant and his "Responsible Medical Officer." Due to the 
dispute, the hospital claimed it was impossible to administer 
any treatment to the applicant. 
As a result, Y, who claimed he was sane, was locked in an 
overcrowded maximum security facility. The state had aban­
doned attempting to treat him and excused his continued con­
finement on the basis of its claim that he was ill, which had 
now become medically irrelevant. Discounting the allega­
tions made by Y on the grounds of his alleged mental illness 
reminds one of the folk wisdom related on many a bumper 
sticker, "Just because you're paranoid don't mean they're not 
70. Id. 
71.  See generally supra notes 20 and 21. 
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out to get you." In United States jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court has held mental health confinement in such circum­
stances unconstitutional at least when the "patient" was con­
fined solely for his own welfare. 72 It has also interdicted plac­
ing persons in a mental institution without a formal 
commitment hearing.73 
One example of a case involving political uses of psychia­
try is that of X, a German lawyer charged with fraud.74 X, in 
turn, accused his public prosecutor of plotting against him 
and of intentionally bringing false charges. He sought to 
have criminal charges brought against the prosecutor. In re­
sponse, the prosecutor, relying on X's attempt at suicide nine 
years earlier, obtained a court order to have X examined by a 
psychiatrist. X refused to be examined, claiming he was not 
mentally ill. X was then placed in a mental institution and 
ultimately agreed to the examination as the only means of 
obtaining his release.75 The court order and its implementa­
tion were before the Commission. 
The Commission began by disposing of the applicant's 
Article 3 claim, finding it manifestly ill-founded. The Com­
mission concluded that it is a common procedure for a court 
to request a psychiatric evaluation of a criminal defendant 
and that such examination, of itself, cannot be considered de­
grading treatment. 
The Commission next proceeded to the Article 876 conten­
tion that the evaluation impinged X's right to privacy. The 
Commission acknowledged that the order for a psychiatric 
evaluation does interfere with Article 8's prescriptions. How­
ever, Article 8 has broad exceptions if the infringement is 
necessary in a democratic society. The Commission found the 
order to be within the exception of Article 8(2) based on the 
rationale that the Court acted within its rights in asking for 
the evaluation: It was in the interests of both X and the 
Court to be apprised of the defendant's mental condition. 
The applicant also complained that the Court was not 
justified in considering a police report unconnected with the 
72. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
73. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1981). 
74. X. v. the Federal Republic of Germany, App. No.83334178, 24 Eur. 
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 103, 103 (1981). 
75. He was examined, found fully criminally responsible and convicted of 
fraud. Id. 
76. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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present case. The Commission disagreed, citing Article 8(2). 
It concluded that the Court did not have jurisdiction to ex­
amine the lawfulness of how it came to be apprised of the doc­
ument and, once disclosed, the Court could not simply disre­
gard it unless it were completely irrelevant. 
The applicant's next complaint was that police retention 
of the record of the attempted suicide was unjustified. The 
Commission found that this was an issue of data protection 
which is within the scope of Article 8, however, it found that 
X had failed to exhaust his domestic remedies on this issue. 
Therefore, X did not prevail on any issue. 
It may well be true that X was incorrect in his claims 
against the public prosecutor. Perhaps he was deluded. The 
case is raised to demonstrate a potential political tactic which 
seems immune from Commission review. The prosecutor was 
able to shift the issue from the questionable legality his own 
behavior to a question of his accuser's sanity. If the psychia­
trist had corruptly or negligently found X insane, that would 
have ended X's claim and probably resulted in X's incarcera­
tion (even if he was not guilty of a crime). A public official­
especially a prosecutor-would likely have easy access to a 
court for such an order. Nothing in the Commission's re­
sponse indicates that it is ready to assist in such 
circumstances. 
Another case which touches on some of the same issues is 
X v. Norway.77 In this case, the applicant had served in the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry since 1963. Commencing in 
1969, he felt that he was subject to surveillance by the intelli­
gence services which exceeded normal security requirements. 
In 1972, he was admitted to a mental hospital for a brief pe­
riod. Thereafter, he was promoted to the rank of Division 
Head with the Foreign Office. In 1973, the applicant filed a 
complaint against some high ranking officials for persecuting 
him, but no action was taken. A few weeks later, the appli­
cant was forcibly confined to a mental hospital with the con­
sent of his family. At the beginning of 1979, he was relieved 
of his duties. 
The applicant contended that his criticism of Norwegian 
officials for subjecting him to surveillance directly resulted in 
his being relieved of his duties. He claimed that this was in 
77. X. v. Norway, App. No. 9401181, 27 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 103, 
103 (1981). 
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violation of Article 10 of the Convention,78 which protects the 
right to free expression. 
The Commission found the applicant's petition to be 
without merit. It determined that there was no evidence to 
suggest that the applicant was hindered in his right to free 
expression since he, in fact, publicly denounced the conduct of 
the high officials. How nice for them that he had been 
branded a lunatic. 
The Commission also gave weight to the Norwegian au­
thorities' denial that applicant was subject to surveillance 
and their assertion that he imagined it. Additionally, the 
Commission found that applicant's feelings of persecution de­
tracted from his ability to do his job. Also, the Commission 
deferred to the judgment of the Norwegian officials that the 
applicant's behavior diminished the prestige and credibility 
of his division. Due to these considerations, the Commission 
found that applicant's transfer to another job at the same sal­
ary did not violate domestic law or the Convention. It there­
fore concluded that the application was ill-founded. 
But could he have been rational and telling the truth? 
Psychiatrists are trained to treat patients based on their ac­
count of events to the physician. Nothing in their training 
makes them able to evaluate the truth of the account as op­
posed to its reflection on the patient's mental health. They 
are not supposed to investigate for truth and do not. One of 
the most curious anomalies concerning forensic use of psychi­
atry is that it uses people with such training to testify to the 
truth of their patient's accounts ! 
Once a person is incarcerated or found incompetent, the 
possibility of involuntary drugging often follows, making 
resistance difficult. In X v. the Federal Republic of Ger­
many,79 the Commission considered the application of the 
Convention to the forced administration of medicine to pa­
tients confined in a mental hospital. In 1971, X was convicted 
of indecent assault and sentenced to two years imprisonment. 
He was found to be of diminished capacity and ordered con­
fined to a psychiatric hospital under domestic law. In 1973, 
the Court reviewed the applicant's condition and found him 
to be dangerous. The Court also appointed a guardian for X, 
78. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
79. X v. The Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 8518179, 20 Eur. 
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 193, 193 (1980). 
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charged with the duty to administer his property and to au­
thorize medical treatment for him. 
X complained that the drugs Psychopharmaca and 
Neuroleptica had been administered with the consent of his 
guardian but against his will. He complained that forced ad­
ministration of the medication violated both Articles 380 and 
8.81 As to Article 3, the Commission concluded that forced 
medication was not inhumane or degrading treatment. They 
deferred to the judgment of the physicians and the guardian 
and found that it was in X's best interests to be medicated by 
force. 
They next considered the Article 8 charge. Article 8 en­
sures the right to a private life. The Commission found that 
when a person is placed under guardianship, it interferes 
with his right to privacy but also found that the appointment 
of a guardian was authorized by domestic law. It relied on 
the exception to Article 8 for prevention of disorder or crime, 
finding that when the applicant failed to take proper medica­
tion, he threatened other patients and wardens with murder. 
It therefore found no violation of Article 8. 
In none of the cases mentioned was psychiatry obviously 
used simply to suppress dissent, although psychiatry has 
been used overtly to accomplish political suppression, as has 
been noted. It is important to observe that the defenses 
available are inadequate to guard against more cynical 
abuses and, of course, to realize that the denial of human 
rights may occur even when there are no darker motives. 
Also, it must be admitted that there has been limited 
protection in some cases against the most egregious types of 
governmental conduct. One example is a case involving the 
recall, without notice, of a former mental patient. In X. v. 
United Kingdom,82 X had been confined to Broadmoor Hospi­
tal after he had been convicted of a violent assault. He was 
subsequently released by the Secretary of State for the Home 
Office on a conditional basis. The conditions of his release 
were that he should live at a specified address with his wife, 
that he should be under the supervision of a probation officer 
and that he should attend a psychiatric out-patient clinic. 
80. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
81. Id. 
82. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6998175, 8 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 106, 106 (1977). 
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However, the Secretary of State for the Home Office retained 
the power to recall him to Broadmoor. 
X lived with his wife and secured a job. After three 
years, he was arrested by the police and returned to 
Broadmoor Hospital but was not informed of the reason for 
his return. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus. At the 
hearing of the writ, three of X's co-workers testified that 
there was nothing unusual about his behavior. His general 
practitioner also testified that there was no cause for concern. 
However, the Court rejected the writ and deferred to the 
analysis of a probation officer. 
The applicant contended that his detention at Broadmoor 
violated Article 3,83 5(1)(C),84 5(2)85 and 5(3).86 The Commis­
sion held that the charge as to Article 3 was inadmissible. 
Once the proceeding commenced, the United Kingdom came 
forward with information as to why X had been recalled to 
Broadmoor. X's wife stated that her previous assurances that 
X was making good progress were untrue. She further com­
plained that he was deluded and threatening, and that she 
was afraid of him. 
Article 5(1)(a) prohibits the detention of a person unless 
his detention is ordered by a competent court. The Govern­
ment contended that since X was only conditionally released 
from Broadmoor, his detention had been ordered by a compe­
tent court. X maintained that this section did not apply to his 
case. 
Article 5(1)(e) prohibits detention unless the detention is 
required to prevent the spreading of infectious diseases, or for 
persons of unsound mind, alcoholics, drug addicts or va­
grants. The applicant claimed that no effort had been made 
to check his state of mind.87 
Article 5(2) requires that those detained be informed of 
the charges against them, however, the Government asserted 
that this section was inapplicable to cases involving section 
5(1)(e).88 The applicant contended that the vague and gen­
eral reasons for his recall were insufficient under section 5(2). 
83. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
85. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
87. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6998/75, 8 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 106, 106 (1977). 
88. Id. 
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The Commission found that the application may have merit 
and found it admissible. In its report of July 16, 1980 it 
found: 
By 14 votes to 2, that X's recall to Broadmoor Hospital 
and further detention there had not violated his rights 
under article 5 ,  paragraph 1; 
Unanimously, that there had been a breach of article 5, 
paragraph 2,  in that X [had not been] given prompt and 
sufficient reasons for his arrest and readmission to 
Broadmoor; 
Unanimously, that article 5 ,  paragraph 4 had been vio­
lated, since X had not been entitled to take proceedings by 
which the lawfulness of his detention consequent upon his 
recall to hospital could be decided speedily by a court.89 
The Commission requested that the European Court of 
Human Rights determine whether the "applicant was a vic­
tim of a violation of article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Con­
vention when he was recalled to Broadmoor Hospital on 5 
April 1974 and whether thereafter the applicant was entitled 
to and received an adequate judicial determination of the 
lawfulness of this renewed detention in accordance with arti­
cle 5, paragraph 4 of the Convention."90 
The Court first disposed of the issue of whether Articles 
5(1)(a) and (5)(1)(e) were applicable. It found that X had been 
convicted by a competent court within the meaning of Article 
5. It therefore found that paragraph l(a) applied. Since he 
was committed to Broadmoor, the Court indicated, subpara­
graph (e), in so far as it related to the detention of 'persons of 
unsound mind', also applied."91 The Court placed particular 
reliance on the fact that X was conditionally released from 
Broadmoor and had enjoyed a lengthy period of liberty. It 
found no breach of article 5, paragraph 1. 
As to Article 5, paragraph 4, the applicant had alleged 
that there was no opportunity to determine judicially the law­
fulness of his detention in Broadmoor. The Court found that 
89. U.N. SUB-COMM'N ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION 
OF MINORITIES, PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES AND GUARANTEES FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF PERSONS DETAINED ON GROUNDS OF MENTAL ILL-HEALTH OR SUFFERING FROM 
MENTAL DISORDER at 33, U.N. Doc. E/Cn.4ISub.211983/17/Rev.l,  U.N. Sales No. 
E.85.XIV.9 (1986). 
90. Id. at Ij[ 93. 
9!. Id. at Ij[ 97. 
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the recall decision by the Home Secretary was based, at least 
in part, on considerations different from those pertaining to 
the original confinement order. Further, though the medical 
condition of a conditionally released patient might change 
with the passage of time, no provision had been made for pe­
riodic review. Therefore, the Court found a breach of Article 
5, paragraph 4. 
The Court next addressed whether the United Kingdom 
violated Article 5, paragraph 2 by failing to inform X of the 
reasons for his recall to the hospital. The Government asked 
the Court to look to its new procedure with regard to recalling 
patients to mental hospitals. They conceded that the old pro­
cedure did not comport with Article 5. Changes had been 
made because of the criticisms made by the European Human 
Rights Commission. 
The Court found that "it was clear from the evidence that 
lack of information as to the specific reasons for the recall, a 
matter almost exclusively within the knowledge of the Home 
Secretary, prevented X's counsel, and thus the Divisional 
Court, from [deciding the original habeas petition] ."92 Since 
the Court had already found a violation of Article 5, para­
graph 4 and the Government had rectified the problems with 
its procedure, it did not decide the issue. 
In Van Der Leer v. The Netherlands Nationwide Life In­
surance CO.93 the Court of Justice determined that the con­
version of a voluntary commitment into involuntary status 
without notice or hearing violated Articles 5(1), 5(2) and 5(4) 
by confining her without the hearing required by national law 
to inform her of the reasons for her new status and in failing 
to resolve the matter speedily. While the case does stand for 
some due process requirement in involuntary commitment, it 
should be noted that several procedures under national law 
which allowed a hearingless detention were not invoked and 
the court merely noted the absence of the justification they 
would provide. The court did, however, equate the confine­
ment with criminal arrest holding that the "arrest" provision 
in Article 5(2) was breached. 
92. Id. 
93. Van der Leer v. The Netherlands, App. r�o. 1 1509/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
567, 567 (1990). 
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In E v. Norway94 the Human Rights Court also invoked 
Article 5(4) to condemn the tardy review of a detention 
although they held that the Norwegian Courts were free to 
hold a person in administrative custody for being "someone 
with an underdeveloped or permanently impaired mental ca­
pacity" creating a danger of recidivism. 95 There was also 
some doubt that review procedures really permitted national 
courts to release the prisoner should they find the adminis­
trative detention improper: Nonetheless, the court gave the 
state process the benefit of the doubt and denied that aspect 
of the Article 5(4) claim. 
In App. No. 12535 /86 v. Netherlands96 the Commission 
held that it retained jurisdiction in a case which had 
progressed through its preliminary examination even though 
the patient who had filed it had since been released. 
On the other hand, consider Keus v. Netherlands. 97 
There a prisoner who, under Dutch law, could be sentenced to 
two year periods of detention at "the Government's disposal" 
in a mental institution following a penal sentence escaped on 
the eve of a hearing to determine whether he should be so 
detained. The government did not notify him for the good 
reason that it could not find him. It also · did not notify his 
lawyer whom they could find. The result was that, when 
shortly thereafter he was returned to custody, he had no au­
thorized court procedure in which to litigate the need for his 
confinement. By a five to four vote, the Court of Human 
Rights found no violation of the hearing provision of Article 
5(4). They agreed that the absence of a court hearing was a 
violation of 5(4) but, precisely for that reason, found that he 
had a remedy. Since the Netherlands was bound by Article 
5(4) and "the fundamental adversarial principle" he could 
have claimed a hearing on the appropriateness of his immedi­
ate release without such a hearing being preestablished by 
law.98 
94. E. v. Norway, App. No. 11701185, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30, 30 (1990). 
95. Id. 
96. App. No. 12535/86 v. Netherlands, App. No. 12535/86, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
46, 102 (1986). 
97. Keus v. Netherlands, App. No. 12228/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 700, 700 
(1990). 
98. Id. at 'lI 28. 
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A study of some of these and other cases was made by 
Professor Dinah Shelton and Dr. Thomais Douraki.99 From a 
review of the cases just discussed as well as from a reading of 
the Shelton-Douraki paper one is led to the conclusion that 
mental patients are rapidly receiving basic due process in Eu­
rope. Unfortunately, as I have written before, due process 
works to illuminate identified issues but helps little when the 
basic issue is itself muddled. 100 The European Court of 
Human Rights in the Winterwerp decision101 realized that 
the convention language for mental illness, a person of un­
sound mind, is not a term which can be given a definite inter­
pretation. With a glimpse of the problem, the court concluded 
that unsound mind cannot be premised on views or behaviors 
which deviate from the norms of a particular society. To 
demonstrate that it did not get the point, the court added 
that the "true" mental disorder should be of a "kind or degree 
warranting compulsory confinement."102 The Shelton­
Douraki study similarly concludes conventionally by noting, 
"[i]t must be considered that often mental patients have disa­
bilities which deprive them of the ability to adequately com­
municate information necessary or relevant to protect their 
human rights."103 
It is a short step from stating that those accused of 
mental illness are sometimes too disabled to communicate to 
"protecting" them by the confinement that the court finds the 
final test of the legitimacy of the diagnosis. To look at the 
accusation of mental illness as an indication of reasons to dis­
regard the claims of the accused is to fall into the trap that 
forensic psychiatry has always set. Since forensic psychiatric 
testimony, as opposed to psychiatric diagnoses for treatment 
purposes, almost always turns on predictions, postdictions or 
statusdictions of behavior, they overlap usual judicial func­
tions. When they are allowed to determine the issue, they 
99. Dinah Shelton & Thomas Douraki, Human Rights and the Mentally TIl 
(1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
100. George J. Alexander, Premature Probate: A Different Perspective on 
Guardianship for the Elderly, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1003 (1979) [hereinafter Alexan­
der, Premature Probate]. 
101. Winterwerp v. Netherlands, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A no. 33) at 387 (1979). 
102. [d. at 'lI 39. 
103. Shelton & Douraki, supra note 99, at 20. 
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usurp those functions. All the evidence we have suggests 
that the testimony is as often wrong as it is right. 104 
As an example, consider Nielsen v. Denmark. 105 In that 
case a mother committed her minor child to a psychiatric 
ward of a state hospital in her role as his custodian. The 
child complained that he did not require medical treatment 
but was placed solely to deny custody to his father. He 
pointed out that he had had no hearing to challenge his con­
finement. On the facts the Commission had found a violation 
of Article 5(1)  and Article 5(4) but the Court of Human Rights 
disagreed. It was satisfied that the mother, when taking the 
decision to commit the child to the hospital, had as her objec­
tive the protection of applicant's health. Hospitalization was 
decided in accordance with expert medical advice, and the 
child was not treated as being of unsound mind nor put in a 
ward with psychotic children. His mother's action was 
viewed as acting in his interests so there was no need of a 
hearing to consider the child's view. Four judges dissented. 
The circumstances fit the non-definition of mental illness per­
fectly. The majority could concern itself with the inability of 
the child to communicate his needs or note that the diagnosis 
had led to forced confinement. The Shelton-Douraki paper 
treats the case as illustrating the need for child protection. 106 
I think it illustrates the error of reliance on psychiatric ad­
vice and any substitute for adversary hearing when incarcer­
ating people. 
IV. A UNITED NATIONS PROPOSAL FOR THE PREVENTION OF 
PSYCHIATRIC USURPATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
CONCERNS 
In 1986, in a commendable recognition of the issues, the 
United Nations commissioned a study of the problems of per­
sons detained on the basis of mental illness to formulate 
guidelines for domestic law which would protect the rights of 
these detainees. The Guidelines are only advisory. They are 
quite comprehensive in scope, undoubtedly well intentioned 
and a substantial advance over existing practice. They none-
104. For my latest summary of this problem together with a citation of rele­
vant authorities see George J. Alexander, Big Mother: The State's Use of 
Mental Health Experts in Dependency Cases, 24 PAC. L.J. 1465 (1993). 
105. 144 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6 (1988). 
106. Shelton & Douraki, supra note 99, at 16. 
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theless ignore some important problems and take what is ar­
guably a wrongheaded approach to others. 107 
The Guidelines begin by prohibiting discrimination 
based on race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other sta­
tuS.108 In addition, they indicate that previous detention in a 
mental hospital may not justify discrimination against the 
former patient. 
The Guidelines then provide that all other fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed are to be accorded mentally ill persons. 
The Guidelines provide the following guarantees in addition 
to the fundamental freedoms: 
1.  A definite time period for detention. 
2. A diagnosis of mental ill-health must be deter­
mined in accordance with internationally accepted medi­
cal standards. 
This statement assumes a far greater agreement among psy­
chiatrists than exists. The failure to agree, that is the failure 
of reliability, is one of the problems which has plagued 
psychiatry. 109 
3. Difficulties in adapting to particular moral, social, 
cultural, or political values may not be a determining fac­
tor in finding mental illness. 
This is a pious statement worthy of consideration. Unfortu­
nately, mental abnormality requires a base line normality for 
comparison. Failure to adapt to accepted values will likely be 
medicalized to mental illness irrespective of this directive. 
Consider whether Joan of Arc could hope to win a trial of her 
sanity. Jesus Christ? Mahatma Ghandi? 
4. Every patient shall be treated in a community-
based facility to the extent possible. 
This is an excellent requirement. It had a good following in 
the United States in the prior decade. Unfortunately, it 
amounted mostly to ending state support: The communities 
did not respond to help even those wanting help. 110 
107. PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES AND GUARANTEES, supra note 89. 
108. Id. at art. 2, 'I 1. 
109. See supra note 20. 
1 10. See ANDREW T. SCULL, DECARCERATION (1977); HOLLY S. WILSON, DEIN­
STITUTIONALIZED RESIDENTIAL CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISORDERED (1982); 
Matt Clark et. at, The New Snake Pits, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1978, at 93. 
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5. Every patient has the legal right to receive social 
and medical services to protect him from harm. 
This provision must be read together with the twelfth provi­
sion which bars unwanted treatment. Great care must be 
taken to see that the right to receive services is not trans­
muted to the duty to be "served." 
6. Mental institutions must be inspected monthly by 
a higher competent authority. 
7. Mental institutions may only accept qualified pa­
tients who a competent court would determine require 
institutionalization. 
This provision represents a substantial advance over prac­
tice. Not only does it require a preadmission procedure, it re­
jects a medical, as opposed to a legal determination. 111 
8. Patients have the right to the least restrictive 
alternative. 
This is an extremely useful norm. It has some domestic sup­
port in the United StatesY2 
9. Psychosurgery and electroconvulsive treatment 
may never be applied without the patient's consent or the 
consent of hislher legal representative. 
This, also, has great merit given the disrepute of both treat­
ment forms. A similar rule has been adopted in some states 
of the United States.113 
10. Psychiatric knowledge shall be used only for diag­
nosis, therapy and treatment of the patient and shall 
never be abused for non-medical purposes. 
So long as psychiatric knowledge is used to impose treatment, 
this provision is confusing. Imposition of confinement and 
compelling treatment (as opposed to the treatment itself) 
would seem, after all, to be state police power purposes, not 
medical purposes. 
11 .  Medication shall be given only for therapeutic 
purpose and shall not be used as punishment. 
111. Cf Doremus v. Farrel, 407 F. Supp. 509 (N.D. Neb. 1975). 
1 12. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
113. Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right 
to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 461 (1978); Note, Regulation of Electro 
Convulsive Therapy, 75 MICH. L. REV. 363 (1976). 
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Although this provision outlaws chemical torture, it misses 
the problem of the use of sedation and tranquilization as re­
sponses to opposition. Both are usually seen as therapeutic. 
12. Every patient has the right to refuse treatment. 
An excellent point. It does not, however, take care of releas­
ing those who cannot be helped by institutionalization be­
cause they refuse treatment.114 Put another way, institution­
alization itself is a form of treatment which every "patient" 
should be allowed to refuse if it is imposed for his or her al­
leged benefit. Also, it should be clear that this requirement 
cannot be overridden by the simple expedient of finding the 
patient incompetent to refuse treatment. Advance directives 
have utility for this purpose.115 
13. Every hospital patient has the right to communi­
cate with people outside the institution. 
14. Patients have the unrestricted right to receive 
and send uncensored communications from and to hislher 
lawyer, guardian or other legal representative or hislher 
family or friends. 
15. Hospital patients also have the right to receive 
visitors regularly. 
16. Hospital patients also have the following rights: 
a. to practice hislher religion 
b. to privacy 
c. to enjoy facilities for education and training 
d. to enjoy facilities for reading, recreation and 
sport 
e. to purchase essential items for daily living 
It is difficult to believe that these rights will not be eroded by 
transforming their exercise to manifestations of illness. Sup­
pose, for example, a person whose religious perspective in­
cludes direct communication with God. Will psychiatrists be 
prohibited from attempting to cure that belief? 
17. Any patient who has not been declared incapable 
(incompetent?) shall not be treated as such because helshe 
has been admitted to a mental institution. 
114. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text. 
1 15. Using advance directives, persons, while they are competent, can ap­
point an agent to carry out their wishes should they become incompetent. Un­
like their contemporaneous demands when they become incompetent, their 
prior written directions are legally binding. See generally LIVING WILL, supra 
note 42. 
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This is a good provision. United States' experience indicates, 
however , that a finding of incompetence will follow 
admission. 116 
18. Every patient not declared incapable has the 
right to exercise hislher civil, political, social or cultural 
rights, including the right to manage hislher own finan­
cial affairs. 
19. Forced labor in mental institutions is prohibited. 
Again, one must guard against forced labor being termed 
therapy. 117 
20. Every patient shall have the right to a qualified 
guardian to protect hislher well-being and interests. 
This norm expresses a view of guardianship as beneficial. 
Too often, unfortunately, guardianship is the principal 
method of depriving the patient of his rights .11s The provi­
sion should at least include the right to choose the surrogate. 
Again, advance directives would be helpful to insure that the 
choice would be accepted. 
For a person voluntarily admitting himlherself to a 
mental institution, the Guidelines provide the following 
rules : 
1 .  Medical standard for admission: 
a. two medical practitioners must concur, after a 
proper personal examination, that the patient is 
suffering from a mental illness and is likely to 
benefit from admission. 
b. the patient has been informed of the purpose of 
the admission. 
c. the patient requests, consents or does not object 
to admission. 
2.  Every voluntary patient has the right to leave the 
mental institution at anytime, unless helshe could be ad­
mitted as an involuntary patient. 
This is the type of provision which makes supposedly volun­
tary admission truly involuntary. A patient is informed that 
if he or she does not consent to treatment, an involuntary ad­
mission will follow.11s The rule should be that a voluntary 
116. GEORGE J.ALEXANDER & TRAVIS H. D. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED 
FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT 135, 136 (1971). 
1 17.  See Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wise. 1974). 
1 18. See, Alexander, Premature Probate, supra note 100. 
1 19. RALPH REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIM. 
INAL ASPECTS 270, 271 (1985). 
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patient may always leave at will. It should be improper to 
use the threat of involuntary admission to keep a voluntary 
patient. Only by putting some barriers between the two can 
the state encourage patients to seek self help without fear of 
being enmeshed in a more coercive system than they seek. 
For a person being committed involuntarily, the Guide­
lines provide the following rules: 
1. Medical standard: 
a. Two medical practitioners must concur that ad­
mission for care and treatment because the pa­
tient is suffering from severe mental illness or 
mental disorder and is a danger to himself or 
others or the community. 
This provision adopts the common notion that involuntary 
hospitalization is justified with which there is sharp disa­
greement.120 It attempts to build in some safeguards against 
excessive confinement but they lack teeth. The insane are 
usually perceived as dangerous. Some objective evidence of 
danger should, at least, be required, such as recent danger­
ous conduct .121 Advance directives should allow a competent 
person to reject future "benefit" by incarceration premised on 
either the person's best interests or because of danger to 
self122 if the state insists on disregarding contemporaneous 
rejection of confinement on competency grounds. 
b. A competent court must order the commitment. 
The court must afford the patient appropriate 
preparation and give himlher a proper hearing 
in the case. 
One cannot quarrel with the spirit of this provision. Unfortu­
nately, mental health issues are more difficult to determine 
than most issues faced by courts. 123 
2. A notice must be given in advance of the judicial 
hearing and must be required by law. 
3.  The notice must be in a language which the pa­
tient understands and must contain the time and place of 
the hearing, the name and address of the lawyer who will 
120. BRUCE J. Ennis, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1972); SZASZ, LAW AND LIB. 
ERTY, supra note 25; Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case 
Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 
54 (1982) [hereinafter Morse]. 
121. REISNER, supra note 119, at 353 n.3. 
122. LIVING WILL, supra note 42, at 76, 77. 
123. See Alexander, Premature Probate, supra note 100. 
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represent the patient, the legal and medical standards for 
committal, the legal rights which the patient has prior to 
the hearing, the grounds and specific facts that are al­
leged to justify commitment and the names of the persons 
who will testify at the hearing. 
4. The patient has the following rights in the pro­
ceedings before the Court: 
a. to be represented by a "trained lawyer and ex­
perienced advocate" 
b. to be heard personally 
c. to attend and participate at the hearing; this 
right may only be abrogated if the patient's be­
havior will disrupt the proceedings. 
423 
The exception is unwise. It is likely to overwhelm the rule.124 
As in criminal cases, presence is some guarantee of fairness. 
Cases in which the patientJdefendant is removed from court 
should be truly exceptional. 
d. to see all relevant documents submitted to the 
court 
e. to call an independent expert witness 
f. to compel the presence of witnesses. 
5. The court must make its findings in writing, stat­
ing the reasons for its decision. 
6. There must be judicial review of the lower court's 
decision which may be initiated by any interested person. 
Does this provide an antagonist a second opportunity to in­
carcerate? It should not do so, especially if the person seek­
ing review has no psychiatric expertise. 
7. The commitment decision must be reviewed at in­
tervals specified by the Court. 
In criminal proceedings it is provided that: 
1 .  A suspected, accused, convicted or detained person 
shall have the right to an independent psychiatric exami­
nation and report whenever his/her mental condition is 
relevant to legal proceedings. 
2.  Neither criminal charges nor criminal conviction 
shall be a sufficient reason for varying the procedures and 
124. In several studies in the United States rules requiring the presence of 
the allegedly incompetent person have been mostly disregarded even with 
stricter language. Lawrence Friedman & Mark Savage, Taking Care: The Law 
of Conseruatorship in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 273 (1988); Peter Horst­
man, Protective Seruices for the Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. 
L. REV. 215, 235 n.81 (1975). 
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standards for determining the presence or absence of 
mental illness. 
3. If there is a serious reason to suspect that an ac­
cused patient is not fit to stand trial because of severe 
mental illness, the Court shall inquire into the question, if 
necessary upon its own authority. 
While the provision is to be commended for involving the 
court in the resolution of issues raised by those "unfit to stand 
trial," the unfitness notion raises the threat of allowing the 
state to keep an innocent person from exonerating him/her­
self. Further safeguards are required to prevent abuse. 
4. A person shall not be held criminally responsible 
by reason of severe mental illness helshe was unable to 
control or criminal impulses helshe was unable to restrain 
or if helshe was unable to appreciate the criminal nature 
of hislher acts. 
There is reason to doubt that the criminal procedure rules are 
as humanitarian as they seem. The insanity defense appears 
to be rarely successful in jurisdictions where it is accepted 
doctrine.125 It often leads to a period of greater incarceration 
than conviction.126 The notion of legal irresponsibility also 
leads to many of the abuses in the civil system. 127 
5. A condition of mental illness which does not fully 
eliminate criminal responsibility should be considered as 
diminishing responsibility and should be taken into con­
sideration by the court in determining the sentence. The 
same concerns expressed about the prior norm apply here. 
6. A patient who is acquitted because of failure to es­
tablish a material element of the offense should be admit­
ted to a mental institution only as a voluntary patient, or 
following a involuntary commitment by order of a compe­
tent court. 
At a minimum, there would not be a longer period of involun­
tary treatment following such acquittal, based on the conduct 
125. The insanity defense is raised in fewer than 2% of criminal cases in the 
United States. It is rarely successful in a contested jury trial. REISNER, supra 
note 119, at 562 n.l. 
126. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
127. See Thomas Szasz & George J. Alexander, Mental Illness as an Excuse 
for Civil Wrongs, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 24 (1967), reprinted in 147 J. NER­
VOUS AND MENTAL DISORDERS 1 13 (1968). 
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which lead to the trial, than the period of incarceration au­
thorized for the crime. 128 
7. If a person is acquitted because of lack of criminal 
responsibility due to severe mental illness, but material 
facts of the crimes were otherwise proven, if helshe is 
amenable to care and treatment, the court may order 
either community-based treatment or, if the commitment 
standards are met, treatment in a mental institution. 
The limitations suggested for the prior provision apply here 
as well. 
8. A convicted person confined to a mental institution 
shall be provided with adequate mental care and 
treatment. 
9. At the end of hislher sentence, a patient shall be 
released and shall not be admitted to or retained in a 
mental institution as an involuntary patient unless the 
commitment standards are met. 
The limitations suggested for the sixth point apply here as 
well. 
As inadequate to the problems as the Guidelines are, 
they represent commendable recognition that serious 
problems lurk behind psychiatric "treatment" decisions. Un­
fortunately, they are not mandatory. Nonetheless, human 
rights advocates should incorporate their teachings and sug­
gested improvements into their claims to begin the process of 
establishing them as customary law. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The coercive use of psychiatry represents a violation of 
basic human rights in all cultures. Some specific violations 
are, obviously, more blatant than other. The main concern 
that must be expressed is that many of the abuses are 
masked as humanitarian gestures and that society has stere­
otyped people it calls lunatics in a far more effective way than 
most racial or ethnic minorities. 
It is well beyond the scope of this article to address ways 
in which one might make substitutions for cw-rent practices. 
128. See Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). This provision should not 
be limited to the greatest potential criminal sentence but should incorporate 
opportunities for earlier release, such as by parole, in the same manner as in 
criminal cases. United States ex. rei. Schuster v. Herrold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2nd 
eir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969). 
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Evaluating alternatives against present perceived problems 
is a daunting task. It has, of course, been partially under­
taken by some scholars.129 
At the moment, there is little resistance to even the most 
Machiavellian use of psychiatry. It is hoped that, by drawing 
attention to the problem, some support for a more determined 
attack on this form of rights abuse will be mustered, and that 
skepticism of the medical aura that surrounds the treatment 
of persons labeled mentally il will be stirred. Few groups of 
psychiatrists these days are likely to join organizations such 
as the Nazi Realm's Work Committee of Institutions for Cure 
and Care, and cure and care will usually not be shorthand for 
administered killing. But will "cure and care" always be be­
nevolent or will it sometimes be dissent opinions that are 
cured and dissidents taken care of in the sense of American 
gangster movies? In any event, can there be an effective sys­
tem of international human rights if it does not guard against 
such possibilities? 
129. See ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 116; SZASZ, LAW AND LIBERTY, 
supra note 25; Morse, supra note 120. 
